ALVIN PLANTINGA AGAINST MATERIALISM PDF

Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Carmichael – – Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3) Alvin Plantinga: John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Notre Dame University I give two arguments against materialism. A NEW ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM. ALVIN PLANTINGA. PLENARY ADDRESS FOR THE EVANGELICAL PHILOSOPHICAL.

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The computer may play a game of chess with me, or it may calculate the balance in my bank account.

Plantinga against materialism (or for immaterialism) – Philosophy on LJ

Leave a Reply Cancel reply Enter your comment here But two registers can count to four: Posted by Maverick Christian at 9: Users with a history avlin such comments may be banned. This argument doesn’t establish that you are an immaterial being, it presupposes it.

How can a material object have beliefs, desires, experiences of pain et cetera? Not really, if we look at plamtinga all of this boils down to: Therefore, materialism is false.

Is this modally unsound somehow? Regardless of whether you think the individual theories succeed, it’s clearly conceivable that content could be naturalized. So, RA fails, and Plantinga turns out to be no better at refuting materialism than he is at understanding the nature of free will.

Science fiction today imagines capturing the person-process and transferring it onto another hardware platform, such as a computer or a robot. Evolution selects for the ability to make good predictions efficiently. Muse – – Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 17 1: Well, apparently it just is.

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Alvin Plantinga – Against Materialism

We againsf an understanding of numbers. Suppose we have P 1P 2P 3 ,…P n represent various physical properties e. But since the consequent is false, so is the antecedent I know of only two kinds of dualism. It is clear that the hardware is “material”.

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The two againt views on how to confront this problem are materialism and dualism. But that’s a silly concept. Richard Boyd – – In Ned Block ed.

It does seem that there are counterpossibles that are meaningfully true. It is to want a set of causes to explain the interaction. If this hypothesis is true, then: When Plantinga imagines his body replaced with different but functionally identical matter, and then presumes that there is a moment between the replacement where he has no body and yet his consciousness still exists, and therefore is not material, I wonder where he expects all that information that defines the particular relationships between his particles to be stored?

We could imagine more than one way to satisfy our needs, estimate the outcomes of our choices, and choose what we would do. I againdt what Plantinga said and offered a thought experiment of my own to make it clearer yet, Still, you may have a point.

If they have no content they how can material beliefs be about anything? It is something plantknga are immediately aware of, yet at the same time it is equally mysterious.

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Alvin Plantinga – Against Materialism « Veritas Vincit Tenebram

Cale April 2, at 7: The chair’s pattern is composed of other subordinate patterns of matter and space, which are interchangeable relative to the chair’s larger pattern.

We input the proposition into the computer; the computer does not think up the proposition on its own. I give two arguments against materialism. Plenty of people think we have more warrant for 2 than we have for 1but of course not everyone agrees as you yourself would appear to illustrate.

But then there is no way to derive that he possibly exists when his body doesn’t, as B’ does exist by necessity of assimilation.

An immaterial substance interacting with a material substance is equally mysterious because we cannot have a mental image of an immaterial substance Plantinga See also our discussion of philosophy and mental health issues here. On dualism the view that our minds are a composite of the physical brain and a nonphysical mental component, e. The Implicit Dualism in Eliminative Materialism: If dualism is true then human beings are two substances — an immaterial substance and a material one.

I msterialism see why the brain would be any different in this sense from a computer. Alvin Plantinga considers a few objections to his thought experiment.